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Abstract
This paper presents a model where opening the capital account of
an economy causes more bankruptcies to take place in the non tradables
sector. Non tradable ￿rms must forecast the future state of the economy
when investing since the demand for their goods depends on this. In
our model the interest rate is a powerful signal that non tradable ￿rms
use when the capital account is closed, but its informational content
decreases once the capital account opens up and international (as well
as domestic) shocks a⁄ect it.
Keywords: Capital Account Openness, Bankruptcies.
1 Introduction
The e⁄ects of capital account liberalization has been a highly debated subject
in economics recently. The suspicion that an open capital account could be
at the root of many ￿nancial crisis took force after the wave of crisis in Asia
in 1997. As has been pointed out by Williamson (1999), what distinguished
the Asian countries that su⁄ered a meltdown from those that didn￿ t was not
so much crony capitalism, lack of supervision of ￿nancial institutions or little
transparency; it was rather a recent passage to an open capital account1. It
￿Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester.
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chetta, Thierry Verdier, Monika Butler, Daniela Fabbri, Aude Pommeret and seminar par-
ticipants in Lausanne and the SMYE 2004 for important comments. All remaining errors
are mine.
1Did Korea, Thailand or Indonesia scored worse in terms of crony capitalism or lack of
supervision than, say, China, Pakistan or Bangladesh? On the other hand, the ￿rst three
countries had opened their capital accounts recently while the others kept it closed.
1seems that it was this last point (or the combination of this last point with
the others) what determined which countries went into crisis and which not2.
The subject is of great interest because until the Asian crisis several in-
stitutions like the IMF advised developing countries to open their economies
to international ￿nancial ￿ ows3. It was expected that this policy would help
countries to grow faster. This view was criticized by several distinguished
economists like Joseph Stiglitz or Jagdish Bhagwati (see Stiglitz 2000, Stiglitz
2002 and Bhagwati 1998). These critics have pointed out that the case for
free trade in capital cannot be just assumed to be the same as the case for
free trade in goods or for free markets in general. Stiglitz (2000) stresses that
the problems related to imperfect information are particularly important in ￿-
nancial markets and Bhagwati (1998) reminds us that capital ￿ ows can su⁄er
from ￿Panics, Manias and Crashes￿ , as Kindleberger (1989) described. The
intellectual debate that took place undermined the con￿dence that probably
existed concerning the e⁄ects of opening the capital account.
Most of the academic debate on capital account liberalization has been
of empirical nature. In short, researchers have used the growth regressions
methodology to try to ￿nd out whether there is a positive growth e⁄ect fol-
lowing the opening of the capital account4. A good synthesis is provided by
Prasad et al. (2003) who review the evidence of 14 of such studies and conclude
that ￿ ... there is no strong, robust and uniform support for the theoretical
argument that ￿nancial globalization per se delivers a higher rate of economic
growth.￿Most of the papers in this literature show no e⁄ect or a mixed e⁄ect
of the policy in question on growth. An attractive theoretical justi￿cation for
this empirical fact has been provided by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003), who
use a calibrated neoclassical model to estimate the welfare e⁄ects of perfect
capital mobility and conclude that they are modest and correspond to a level,
not a growth e⁄ect.
A liberalized capital account has not only failed to deliver a clear growth
2Because of some posible confusion we should make clear that this paper is concerned with
the liberalization of international debt ￿nancing (that we call Capital Account Liberaliza-
tion), which includes both direct and indirect ￿nancing (i.e. both ￿rms issuing bonds abroad
and banks borrowing from international lenders). Our discussion will not concern Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) or international equity ￿nancing (opening the stock markets to
international investors). All the above are also to be distinguished from the liberalization
of the domestic ￿nancial system, which refers mainly to eliminating restrictions on interest
rates and which is often refered to symply as ￿￿nancial liberalization￿ .
3In 1997, the IMF proposed to make the ￿liberalization of capital movements one of the
purposes of the IMF￿(see Wilson 2004).
4Examples of this literature are Edison et al. (2002), Edwards (2001) and Arteta et al.
(2001).
2e⁄ect but, in addition, some argue that it has created a more unstable economic
environment in emerging countries. Kose et al. (2003) show that countries with
larger ￿nancial ￿ ows had higher volatility of consumption, at least among
developing countries.5 Another piece of evidence comes from Bordo et al.
(2001), who note that ￿banking crises have been less frequent since 1973 when
[capital] controls were present.￿ 6
This paper will be concerned with the problems that an opening of the
capital account might pose to an emerging economy; more particularly to
their ￿rms in the non tradables sector. As has been documented by Tornell
and Westerman (2002), the consequences of ￿nancial crises in middle income
countries is asymmetric between the tradables and non tradables sector. In
the years preceding the crisis the non tradables sector typically grows faster
that the tradables one; but the crises produces a deeper and longer lasting
recession in the non tradables sector. A proximate cause of this di⁄erence
among sectors can be seen in the evolution of the real exchange rate in times
of crises. For the episodes studied by Tornell and Westermann (2002), the real
exchange rate falls strongly below its level of tranquil times. This means that
the price of non traded goods is particularly low during turbulent times, which
help us understand why the non tradables sector was more a⁄ected. Arguably,
several non tradable ￿rms are forced to abandon the market when their price
falls and their replacement is a process that can take a few years. What is less
clearly understood is through what mechanism this scenario takes place and
what (if any) would be the role of a liberalized capital account.
The model we present in this paper o⁄ers a mechanism linking the open-
ness of the capital account with an increased incidence of bankruptcies in the
non tradables sector. Our model builds on the important observation that
there exist a time lag between the moment when a ￿rm starts investing in the
production of a given product and the moment when this product actually
reaches the market. A good illustration in the non tradables sector would be
real estate, where the time between the beginning of a construction and its
sale can be up to several years. This is also true in the tradables sector. An
exporter of manufactures who decides to start producing a new good will also
need some time to build its production lines and capacitate its labor force
before the product can be sold.
This fact implies that any producer must form a forecast of the demand
5An increase in the measure of ￿nancial openness in Kose et al. (2003) increases the
volatility of total consumption relative to that of total production.
6Note, however, that Bordo et al. (2001) also show that currency crises were more
frequent in countries with capital controls (as opposed to banking crises).
3for its product in the near future. Underestimating this future demand would
mean missing pro￿table opportunities by investing too little while overestimat-
ing it could drive the ￿rm into trouble since it would not be able to realize the
gains that are needed to pay for the costs incurred before. When considering
this problem, we realize that there is an important di⁄erence between trad-
able and non tradables ￿rms, namely the fact that for the former the demand
comes potentially from the whole world while for the latter the demand is ex-
clusively domestic. Thus, non tradable ￿rms are the ones who are interested
in the future evolution of domestic demand and could su⁄er if they fail to see
a coming slowdown in it.
Our model argues that ￿rms evaluate the future evolution of the economy
by using signals, and that some of these signals become more noisy, and thus
less informative, once the capital account is opened. The signal we will be
interested in is the interest rate.
More precisely, we will assume that ￿rms must invest at time t in order
to produce at time t + 1 and that the economy is hit by technological shocks
every period. If the economy is hit by a positive shock at t (the good state of
nature) then a lot of investment opportunities will arise so ￿rms￿investment
will increase and the economy￿ s output will be high next period. The opposite
is true in case of a negative shock (bad state of nature). Non tradable ￿rms
would like to invest more when the state of nature is good and less otherwise;
but the state of nature is unobservable. Note that knowing the state of nature
is not a concern for tradables ￿rms since their demand is not a⁄ected by it.
Non tradables ￿rms will be able to deduce the current state of nature by
extracting the information contained in the interest rate. The interest rate will
react to movements in the domestic demand for loanable funds, raising when
this last one is strong and falling when it is weak. Thus, a high interest rate
will signal non tradable producers strong aggregate investment and therefore
strong demand for their products next period. Non tradable producers will
want to invest a lot in this case. The opposite phenomena would take place
when low aggregate investment drives the interest rate down.
What changes when the country opens its capital account and lets foreign
capital to be o⁄ered to domestic ￿rms? In this case the interest rate will be
a⁄ected not only by the conditions in the local market but also by the di⁄erent
shocks a⁄ecting international capital markets. Since the supply of funds will
no longer be purely domestic, an external shock will shift it and modify the
interest rate. When non tradable ￿rms observe a rising interest rate they can
attribute it to two di⁄erent causes: an increase in the country￿ s demand for
loanable funds, as in the preceding case, but also a rise in the international
interest rate due to changes in global markets. In one word, the interest rate
4will become a more noisy signal and ￿rms will ￿nd it more di¢ cult to extract
the information they need from it. Under an open capital account non tradable
￿rms will make more mistakes, investing too much when the economy is about
to su⁄er a slowdown. This in turn will lead to an excess supply of non tradable
goods and to the bankruptcies of the less e¢ cient ￿rms in the sector.
Our paper is related to other works studying the e⁄ects of opening the
capital account of an economy. Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004), for
instance, present a model where economies with an intermediate degree of
￿nancial development can become more volatile by opening to international
capital ￿ ows. This takes place because of the creation of a boom-bust cycle
where ￿rms use the new capital in￿ ows to invest more, increase their pro￿ts
and thus expand their borrowing capacity, which allows them to invest even
more and create a boom. This boom comes to an end when the price of a
non tradable input is pushed up, causing pro￿ts to fall and reducing the ￿rm￿ s
borrowing capacity. This reduces investment, which causes a further reduction
in pro￿ts and creates a bust.
Another relevant paper is the one by Rivera-Batiz (2001), who treats the
problem by considering an endogenous growth model where a corrupt gov-
ernment taxes entrepreneurs. This reduces the returns to invest in R&D and
therefore slows down growth. He shows that, given this setting, opening the
capital account can be growth decreasing. Such a possibility arises if the coun-
try is very corrupt and returns to investment are lower at home than in the
international market. Capital ￿ ight will be the consequence of capital openness
for those countries, and slower growth will follow.
2 The model
The model has an OLG structure and presents three types of agents: con-
sumers, tradable goods producers and non tradable goods producers. We
will note tradable and non tradable goods as T and NT goods respectively.
Tradable goods will be the numØraire in the model. Consumers live for two
periods, they work in the ￿rst period and consume in the second one. The
totality of consumer￿ s revenues when young is thus saved and lent to the ￿rms
through a perfectly competitive banking sector. When old, consumers receive
the amount they have lent plus interests and the totality of the ￿rms￿pro￿ts,
since they are the ultimate owners of the ￿rms created last period. They use
all these revenues to ￿nance consumption.
Firms also live for two periods. In the ￿rst period, and if it is pro￿table to
do so, they borrow funds from consumers and invest them in order to produce
5next period. In the second period they produce, sell their goods, pay back
their loans and distribute their pro￿ts to their owners, namely old consumers.
In our model bankruptcies will take place in the non tradables sector. All
tradable ￿rms will be assumed to be identical and pro￿table. Non tradable
￿rms, on the contrary, are all di⁄erent and the least e¢ cient among them will
su⁄er bankruptcies.
As we mentioned before, each period the economy ￿nds itself in a given
state of nature, a bad one with probability p and a good one with probability
1 ￿ p. The good state of nature will be characterized by a high demand for
loanable funds; in other words, ￿rms are willing to invest a lot. We can think
that the state of nature re￿ ects the variable ￿ ow of ideas and innovation in the
economy. Each period ￿rms come up with projects for new types of goods and
ideas for expanding or improving the existing ones. The realization of these
projects requires both time and resources. Any given entrepreneur cannot
observe what is the aggregate number of new ideas created this period. All she
can observe is whether she has a new idea or not. If the answer is positive then
she will proceed to invest in order to realize it. Thus, the periods characterized
by a large number of new ideas will also be the periods with a high demand
for loanable funds.
To simplify, we will assume that this variable ￿ ow of ideas will characterize
only tradable ￿rms. It is enough that one sector of the economy su⁄ers from
these random shocks for the future domestic demand to be variable.
An important assumption that our model makes is that aggregate invest-
ment, and -in the open capital account case- aggregate capital in￿ ows, cannot
be observed contemporaneously by any single entrepreneur. If this was the
case, entrepreneurs would not need to use any signal in the ￿rst place since
the level of aggregate investment would give them the level of aggregate do-
mestic demand next period. As already noted, while each entrepreneur knows
its own investment decision, she does not know the decision of everyone else.
The process of collecting all individual data to form a statistic on aggregate
investment takes some time; so at the moment they take their investment de-
cisions entrepreneurs must rely on the signals provided by the economy like
the interest rate.
Below we present each agent in more detail under a closed capital account.
Once the equilibrium of the closed capital account case is described we will
pass to the open capital account situation.
62.1 Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers of measure 1. They work when young and
consume when old. A consumer who is young at t supplies inelastically L units
of labor and receives a labor income of wtL: It then lends all these funds to the
￿rms at the gross interest rate Rt+1: Next period he receives back the funds
he has lend plus the pro￿ts ￿rms have made since he is the ultimate owner of
the ￿rms. This allows him to consume Ct+1:
Ct+1 = wtLRt+1 +
X
j
￿
j
t+1 (1)
where Ct is a composite consumption good formed by both tradable and
non tradable goods7:
Ct =
h
v
1
￿(C
T
t )
￿￿1
￿ + (1 ￿ v)
1
￿(C
NT
t )
￿￿1
￿
i ￿
￿￿1
(2)
The parameter ￿ de￿nes the degree of substituability between tradable and
non tradable goods. For ￿ = 1 we would have the case of perfect substitutes
while for ￿ = 0 we would have perfect complements (i.e. the Leontie⁄ func-
tion). The parameter v determines the part of income that consumers allocate
to tradable goods.
Note for further use that the price of the composite good is given by:
Pt =
￿
v(P
T
t )
1￿￿ + (1 ￿ v)(P
NT
t )
1￿￿￿ 1
1￿￿ =
￿
v + (1 ￿ v)(P
NT
t )
1￿￿￿ 1
1￿￿
where P T
t and P NT
t are respectively the prices of tradable and non trad-
able goods and P T
t = 1 (tradable goods are the numØraire). The utility of
consumers at time t will be given by:
Ut = C
￿
t
The parameter ￿, which belongs to the interval (0;1), de￿nes both the
elasticity of the utility function (which equals ￿) and the relative risk aversion
of the consumers (which equals 1 ￿ ￿).
7Note that equation (1) tells us that both the wage wt and the ￿rms￿pro￿ts ￿t are
measured in units of the composite consumption good.
72.2 Tradable goods producers
Tradable goods producers su⁄er the technological shocks described earlier. If
at time t the state of nature is good then there are a lot of new pro￿table
opportunities and the number of tradable ￿rms investing is high. In a bad
state of nature few pro￿table opportunities are available so there will be less
tradable ￿rms willing to invest. The number of tradable ￿rms investing at
time t will be noted nT
t and will equal nT;h in a good state of nature and nT;l
in a bad one (nT;h > nT;l):
Each tradable ￿rm that is investing borrows one unit of the composite good
at time t that it must pay back at t + 1. This constitutes the ￿xed costs of
setting up the ￿rm. Having done this at t, a ￿rm can produce at t+1 using the
production function yT = fT(Lj): The ￿rm hires labour in order to maximize
its pro￿ts, measured in units of the composite good:
Max ￿
T
t+1 = fT(Lj)
1
Pt+1
￿ wt+1Lj ￿ Rt+1
which gives the demand for labor of a T ￿rm:
Lj = f
0￿1
T (wt+1Pt+1)
Finally, note that since the number of T ￿rms investing is nT
t and each one
of them needs to invest one unit of the composite good in order to produce
next period, the demand of loanable funds from the T sector will equal just
nT
t :
2.3 Non Tradable goods producers
Non tradable goods producers are not subject to shocks like in the tradables
sector. The problem that NT producers face when deciding whether to invest
or not is the incertitude concerning the demand for their goods next period.
If at time t the number of tradable ￿rms investing is large then the country￿ s
GDP next period will also be large, so they should invest a lot in order to
respond to this prospective large demand. The opposite is true when the
number of tradable ￿rms investing falls.
There is a continuum of n potential NT producers and we will note nNT
t
the number of potential NT producers who actually decide to invest at time t:
In order to produce at t+1 NT ￿rms must proceed in the same way T ￿rms do:
￿rst they must invest some quantity of the composite good at period t as an
initial ￿xed cost and at period t+1 they can take advantage of the production
function yNT = fNT(Li): Just as for T ￿rms, their demand for labor of NT
8￿rms can be calculated and will be given by:
Lj = f
0￿1
NT(wt+1
Pt+1
P NT
t+1
)
The main di⁄erence with respect to the T sector is that we will assume that
each NT ￿rm has a di⁄erent level of e¢ ciency and that this is re￿ ected in
the amount each one needs to invest at t: Each ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency is private
information. The most e¢ cient ￿rms will need to invest a smaller amount
while the less e¢ cient ones would need to invest more. We will note this
amount hi and assume that hi is distributed among ￿rms following a cdf that
we will note G(hi): Due to this heterogeneity among NT ￿rms the supply of
NT goods will vary according to the future prospects of the economy.
The only source of incertitude in the model comes from the state of nature.
Assume for the moment that NT ￿rms are able to deduce correctly the current
state of nature (this will proved to be the case under a closed capital account).
Once the state of nature is known the rest of the variables of the model can
be calculated. In particular, NT ￿rms￿pro￿t in terms of the composite good
will be given by:
￿
NT;i
t+1 =y
NT P NT
t+1
Pt+1
￿ wt+1Li ￿ hiRt+1 if y
NT P NT
t+1
Pt+1
￿ wt+1Li ￿ hiRt+1 > 0
=￿￿ otherwise.
As can be seen, the above equation considers the possibility of bankruptcy.
If the ￿rm·s revenues are not enough to pay wages and debts then the ￿rm
will be bankrupt and will su⁄er a private cost of bankruptcy equal to ￿: This
cost of bankruptcy can have several interpretations: it can represent the loss
of intangible assets that bankrupt ￿rms su⁄er, the e⁄orts that have been used
up in managing the ￿rms that ￿nally provides no bene￿ts or it can stand for
a reputational cost that bankrupt entrepreneurs must bear. For simplicity
we will assign an exogenous and constant value to this cost, but one could
endogenize it by assuming that bankrupt entrepreneurs are excluded from
capital markets for one period. In this case the cost of going bankrupt would
equal the amount of pro￿ts that will not be realized because of the ￿rm￿ s
failure.
The pro￿t function is depicted in ￿gure 1. All ￿rms whose pro￿t will be
positive will decide to invest. This will be the case of the most e¢ cient segment
of ￿rms, namely those for which hi is lower or equal than a limit value h￿
t given
by:
h
￿
t =
yNT PNT
t+1
Pt+1 ￿ wt+1Li
Rt+1
9It follows that the number of NT ￿rms investing at t is nNT
t = nG(h￿
t); the
supply of NT goods at t+1 will be yNT
t nNT
t and the demand for funds coming
from the NT sector equals n
R h￿
t
￿1 hig(hi)dhi , where g(hi) is the pdf associated
to G(hi):
What should be underlined is that, given our assumption that NT ￿rms can
perfectly deduce the current state of nature of the economy, no bankruptcies
will take place in the NT sector. As argued in the Introduction, this will
be possible by exploiting the information given by the interest rate when the
capital account is closed. This can be explained by looking at the market for
loanable funds, represented in Figure 2.
The supply of loanable funds equals wtLt , i.e. the total revenues of young
consumers. The demand for loanable funds is nT
t + n
R h￿
t
￿1 hig(hi)dhi: This
demand is decreasing in Rt+1 (because of the presence of h￿
t) and shifts for
di⁄erent values of nT
t : NT ￿rms know all aspects of the economy except the
current state of nature. Thus, they can calculate the interest rate that should
prevail in a good state of nature and in a bad state of nature. If they believe
the state of nature is good then they will expect to observe R1. If the interest
rate turns out to be lower this will signal them that the actual state of nature
is the bad one, so they will change their behavior until the observed interest
rate coincides with the one they expect.
In this way, the interest rate will transmit all the information needed in
order to deduce the actual state of nature.
2.4 Equilibria with a closed capital account
In its closed economy version, the equilibrium of the model can be found by
solving a system of 3 equations in the 3 endogenous variables Rt+1;P NT
t+1;wt+1.
The equations are given by the equilibrium conditions of the market for loan-
able funds, the market for NT goods and the labor market. They can be found
in the Appendix A of this paper.
2.5 The Economy with an open capital account
Let us address now the situation under an open capital account. In this case,
the supply of loanable funds will come not only from domestic sources but also
from foreign ones. As a result, this supply schedule will become more elastic8.
Still, NT ￿rms could use the same mechanism as before to infer the current
state of nature of the economy. The fact that the supply of loanable funds has
8See Appendix B for a formal derivation of the supply of loanable funds under an open
capital account.
10become more elastic doesn￿ t change anything: ￿rms could still calculate the
interest rate that would prevail in a good and in a bad state of nature just as
in the closed capital account case.
The critical di⁄erence that will render the interest rate a less powerful signal
is the fact that the foreign supply of funds can be a⁄ected by changes in world
￿nancial markets. This will be represented by an international risk-free interest
rate which equals R￿+"t , where "t is an exogenous shock a⁄ecting world capital
markets and following a distribution N(0;￿): A change in R￿ + "t shifts the
foreign supply of loanable funds and as a consequence produces changes in
the domestic interest rate. Thus, there will be two sources of ￿ uctuation in
the interest rate, one of domestic origin and one of international origin, and
NT ￿rms will not be able to distinguish among them. A high interest rate
can be caused by a strong demand for loanable funds but also by a rise in the
international interest rate.
In ￿gure 3 we represent the market for loanable funds under an open capital
account. The supply of loanable funds is more elastic than in the closed capital
account case but we do not assume the extreme case of perfect elasticity9. As in
the closed capital account case, NT producers observe the interest rate and use
it as a signal informing about the current state of nature. But contrary to the
closed capital account situation, any observed interest rate is now compatible
with both a good and a bad state of nature.
Suppose, for instance, that the interest rate R1 is observed. Does this
signals a good or a bad state of nature? As ￿gure 3 shows, this interest rate
would be obtained if the demand for loanable funds was high (i.e. in a good
state of nature) and the supply of loanable funds was at the relatively high
level given by Sfhigh: However, this interest rate is also compatible with a low
demand for funds (a bad state of nature) and a relatively low level of the supply
of funds, given by Sflow: It follows that the interest rate does not perfectly
uncover the actual state of nature as it did when the international shock did
not a⁄ect the country. But it is still the case that the interest rate provides
some information about the state of nature. Since the demand for funds can
take only two values (high or low), when observing R1 investors know that the
economy must be either in equilibrium A or in equilibrium B on ￿gure 3. They
don￿ t know on which one but they do know the unconditional probability of
9With a perfectly elastic supply curve our conclusion would be even more drastic since
the interest rate would not react to changes in the demand for funds and therefore would
become completely uninformative about the state of nature. Since this results holds only
for an in￿nite elasticity of supply we prefer to concentrate on the more general case of a
￿nite elasticity of supply. The interest rate is still informative but less than in the closed
capital account case.
11having a good and a bad state of nature and the distribution of international
￿nancial shocks (i.e. how likely it is that the supply of funds is as high as
Sfhigh or as low as Sflow ). It follows that they can use Bayesian updating
to calculate the probability of being in equilibrium A or B, which is just the
probability that the state of nature is good or bad conditional on the observed
R1:
Let us note as "l
t(R1) the value of the shock that shifts the supply of funds
to Sflow and "h
t(R1) the one that shifts it to Sfhigh (note that we have pointed
out that these values depend on the observed R1). Then, the probability of a
bad state of nature conditional on the observed R1 will be given by:
p
l
t =
pf("l
t)
pf("l
t) + (1 ￿ p)f("h
t)
where f is the density function of "t and p the unconditional probability
of a bad state of nature.
Being uncertain about the state of nature, NT ￿rms will base their decision
to invest no longer on known future pro￿ts but rather on expected pro￿ts, given
by:
E￿
i
NT;t+1 = (1 ￿ p
l
t)￿
i;h
NT;t+1 + p
l
t￿
i;l
NT;t+1
where
￿
NT;i;h
t+1 =y
NT;hP
NT;h
t+1
P h
t+1
￿ w
h
t+1L
h
i ￿ hiRt+1 if y
NT P
NT;h
t+1
P h
t+1
￿ wt+1Li ￿ hiRt+1 > 0
=￿￿ otherwise
￿
NT;i;l
t+1 =y
NT;lP
NT;l
t+1
P l
t+1
￿ w
l
t+1L
l
i ￿ hiRt+1 if y
NT P
NT;l
t+1
P l
t+1
￿ wt+1Li ￿ hiRt+1 > 0
=￿￿ otherwise
As can be seen, pro￿ts can be high or low according to the state of nature
and each eventuality is assigned the updated probability discussed before. The
decision of NT ￿rms on whether to invest or not can be explained with the
help of ￿gure 4. This ￿gure is similar to ￿gure 1 but now we represent the
pro￿t function under a good state of nature and under a bad state of nature.
As can be seen the most e¢ cient ￿rms (i.e. those with lower hi) make positive
pro￿ts both with a good and with a bad state of nature. These ￿rms will
12certainly invest. The less e¢ cient ￿rms, on the other hand, will go bankrupt
under any state of nature. They will certainly not invest. Finally, for middle
values of hi we have ￿rms that would do a positive pro￿t under a good state
of nature but that would go bankrupt if the state of nature is bad. Some of
these ￿rms will invest.
We can de￿ne h￿￿
t such that:
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The NT ￿rm with hi = h￿￿
t has an expected pro￿t of zero. It follows that
all NT ￿rms with hi ￿ h￿￿
t will decide to invest. But this means that at every
period there will be a positive amount of ￿rms that will go bankrupt if the
state of nature is bad. These are the ￿rms with hb
t ￿ hi ￿ h￿￿
t , where hb
t is
de￿ned as:
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The main conclusion of this section is then that under an open capital ac-
count bankruptcies will take place each time the state of nature is bad. This
happens because the interest rate is a⁄ected by both domestic and interna-
tional shocks and has become a noisy signal. NT ￿rms guide themselves by
expected pro￿ts in order to invest, so too few ￿rms invest when the state of
nature is good and too many when it is bad. This second fact has the con-
sequence that the less e¢ cient ￿rms that did invest will ￿nd themselves in
bankruptcy in bad states of nature. When a ￿rm goes bankrupt its creditors
loose all the funds they had lent to it. Since old consumer￿ s revenue depends
in great part on the loans they have accorded to ￿rms, bankruptcies will nega-
tively a⁄ect their income and force them to reduce consumption. In this way,
bankruptcies will decrease welfare in an important way.
Under an open capital account the model has 5 endogenous variables:
Rt+1;P
NT;h
t+1 ;P
NT;h
t+1 ;wh
t+1 and wl
t+1: It can be solved with the system of equa-
tions presented in Appendix C.
133 Simulating the model
3.1 Methodology and parameter values
In this section we simulate the model and show how the performance of the
economy under a closed capital account compares with that of the economy
under an open capital account10. To simulate the evolution of the economy
over time we proceed in the following manner: each period the system of equa-
tions given in Appendix A (for the closed capital account case) or in Appendix
C (for the open capital account case) has to be solved numerically. This gives
us the values of the endogenous variables for that period, which can be used to
calculate all other variables. At each period we will need a realization of the
state of nature and, for the open capital account case, of the shock to inter-
national ￿nancial markets. This is done using a random numbers generator.
The equilibrium of a given period a⁄ects the next period￿ s equilibrium via the
domestic supply of funds (which equals last period￿ s labor income).
Once we have the time path of consumption, welfare can be calculated as
W =
T X
t=1
C￿
t
(1 + ￿)t￿1 (3)
In our simulations we will use ￿ = 1:25 and v = 0:5 for the composite
consumption good de￿ned in equation (2). The ￿rst value implies some degree
of substituability between tradable and non tradable goods and the second
one says that if prices of non tradables and tradables are equal then the share
of income attributed to each type of good would be one half. The number
of tradable goods producers who are willing to invest is equal to 1 in a good
state of nature and 0:7 in a bad one. In other words, the number of new
ideas or projects in the tradable sector falls by 30 % in bad states of nature.
The international risk-free interest rate is set at a level low enough to ensure
that capital will ￿ ow into the country once the capital account is liberalized
(we use R￿ = 1:15): For the production functions we use fNT = L0:5 and
fT = 5 + L0:5: The positive constant in the production function for tradables
ensures that their pro￿t will be positive. The distribution of the e¢ ciency
measure hi among non tradable ￿rms will be normal with parameters ￿ = 2
and ￿ = 0:5:
10All parameter values and functional forms that have been used in these simulations are
presented in Appendix D.
143.2 The e⁄ects of a bad state of nature
We start by comparing the e⁄ects of a bad state of nature under a closed and
an open capital account. Since consumption is the determinant of welfare in
this model we will concentrate our attention on its evolution over time. Figure
5 shows the level of consumption for the two cases of interest over a 20-period
interval where a bad state of nature takes place at periods t = 8 and t = 16:
This ￿gure illustrates well the positive and negative consequences of opening
the capital account. On the positive side we note that the economy with an
open capital account enjoys a higher level of consumption in all periods where
the state of nature is good. This is the product of the larger availability of
investable funds, which allows ￿rms to ￿nance more projects. We note that
this positive e⁄ect on consumption is a level -and not a growth- e⁄ect; in
accordance with the empirical record reviewed at the beginning of the paper.
On the negative side we can note that consumption is more volatile under
an open capital account, which is caused by the prevalent shocks to interna-
tional ￿nancial markets that we have included in the model. A more serious
problem is the fact that the fall in consumption that is observed in a bad
state of nature is much larger when the capital account is open. It is on this
aspect that the present model has been focused, the larger fall in consumption
is explained by the bankruptcies that take place in the non tradables sector
when the state of nature is bad.
Another way to look at the e⁄ects of a bad state of nature is to construct
￿impulse-response￿functions showing the e⁄ect of a bad state of nature on an
economy that is initially at its steady state11. Figure 6 shows such impulse-
response functions under a closed and under an open capital account. Here the
level of consumption at each period is given as a percentage of its steady-state
value. It is noticeable that after a bad state of nature consumption falls by 12
% in the closed capital account case and by a heftier 33 % when the capital
account is open. The recovery from such falls is not immediate because the fall
in wage revenues in a bad state of nature reduces the domestic supply of funds,
thus containing investment in the crisis period and production in the following
period. The recovery when the capital account is open can be quali￿ed as
faster (since it rebounds from a lower point) and this is explained by the fact
that the domestic supply of funds is less important when the country has access
11Under a closed capital account the economy does attain a steady state after a long
enough series of good states of nature since there would be no shock hitting the economy.
This is not the case under an open capital accont because of the shocks to international
capital markets. For the open capital account case we have calculated the impulse-response
function by taking the average values over a large number of simulated episodes.
15to funds from abroad.
The two ￿gures just described make the point that an economy faces a
trade o⁄when it decides to open itself to international ￿nancial ￿ ows. On the
one hand there is a well-understood positive e⁄ect on production stemming
from the larger availability of investable funds. On the other hand there is
an increase in the welfare cost of bad states of nature, caused by the loss of
informational value of the interest rate. Explaining this last e⁄ect was the
main point of the paper. In the following subsection we will try to evaluate
the net welfare e⁄ect of opening the capital account focusing on the role of
the probability of bad states of nature and the degree of risk aversion of the
consumers.
3.3 Welfare analysis
As suggested in the preceding paragraph, the net welfare e⁄ect of opening the
capital account can be positive or negative. Since the disadvantage of an open
capital account comes from the steep falls in consumption during bad states
of nature, the net welfare e⁄ect will depend crucially on the frequency of these
bad states and on how important it is for consumers to bear such a risk. In
other words, the parameters p (the unconditional probability of a bad state of
nature) and ￿ (which gives the relative risk aversion of consumers, 1￿￿) will
be two main determinants of the welfare changes.
In ￿gure 7 we examine the role of p: This ￿gure graphs the expected welfare
(given by equation 3) for the closed and open capital account for di⁄erent
values of this parameter. Three aspects are noteworthy in this ￿gure: ￿rst, for
very low values of p welfare will be higher with an open capital account since
the main problem linked to this policy -namely the bankruptcies during bad
states of nature- will be almost absent. Second, while the welfare decreases
with p for both economies, it decreases faster for the open capital account
economy. This is the case because a bad state of nature is more damaging
under an open capital account. Finally, for a high enough value of p we note
that an open capital account is welfare decreasing. In the ￿gure this value is
around 0:10, but it will change with di⁄erent parameter values. Summarizing,
the larger the unconditional probability of bad states of nature, the more likely
that an opening of the capital account will decrease welfare.
Figure 8 adds to the above analysis one dimension by considering the role
of the parameter ￿: Higher values of this parameter imply a lower level of
relative risk aversion. The upper panel of ￿gure 8 shows the percentage change
16in welfare following an opening of the capital account as a function of both p
and ￿: The bottom panel shows us the contour lines of the three dimensional
￿gure on the top.
Let us start by analyzing the bottom panel of ￿gure 8. As can be seen, the
change in utility is always a decreasing function of p, just as we have seen in
￿gure 7. The value of p for which the change in welfare passe from positive
to negative varies in this ￿gure between 0:10 and 0:125: The second message
of this ￿gure is that opening the capital account might be welfare decreasing
for consumers with strong risk aversion but welfare increasing if risk aversion
is low. This happens when the probability of having bad states of nature is
in an ￿intermediate￿level. As the ￿gure shows, when this probability is low
enough, opening the capital account will increase welfare for any value of ￿:
Similarly, if p is high enough then welfare will decrease whatever the level of
risk aversion. It is when the probability of bad states of nature takes values
in the 0:10 to 0:12 interval that the level of ￿ changes the sign of the welfare
e⁄ect. For low values of ￿ (high risk aversion) the net welfare e⁄ect would be
negative while for high enough values (low risk aversion) the e⁄ect turns out
to be positive.
It is important to note here that the actual magnitude of the change in
welfare cannot be compared since utility is an ordinal -and not a cardinal-
measure. In other words we cannot say that consumers with low risk aver-
sion would be ￿more eager￿to accept an opening of the capital account than
consumers with high risk aversion because their increase in utility would be
larger. Having said this, we can now explain the shape of the surface in the
upper panel of ￿gure 8.
In this ￿gure, the percentage change in Welfare is an increasing function
of ￿ for low values of p while it becomes a decreasing function of ￿ when p
is large enough (passing through an intermediate zone where the relationship
is actually U-shaped). This can be explained by recalling that ￿ is also the
elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. In our model, when a country
opens its capital account it ￿exchanges￿a pair of consumption levels (good
state - bad state of nature) against another pair where the good level is higher
but the bad level is lower. The welfare e⁄ect of this change will depend on
the probability of having bad states of nature. Now, for a given value of this
probability, how would the welfare change be a⁄ected when ￿ increases? Since
￿ is the elasticity of the utility function, a larger ￿ will increase the gains (and
the losses) in utility that consumers experience during good (resp. bad) states
of nature. Thus, a larger ￿ increases the welfare gain of an event that takes
place with probability 1 ￿ p while it also increases the loss of an event that
takes place with probability p: If p is low enough the net e⁄ect will be positive;
17after a certain value of p the net e⁄ect will be negative.
Moreover, the bigger is ￿, the less concave is the utility function; which
implies that the positive welfare e⁄ect increases in size with respect to the
negative one. This is why the net changes in welfare become larger and larger
as we increase ￿ for a given value of p:
4 Conclusion and policy implications
We have presented a model where an opening of the capital account increases
the incidences of bankruptcies in the non tradables sector during economic
slowdowns. The reason is that when the capital account is open the interest
rate becomes a less informative signal for non tradable producers. This implies
that they will be less e¢ cient at predicting future slowdowns of domestic
demand and will ￿nd themselves in an excess supply situation that will drag
into bankruptcy the more vulnerable among them. The interest rate becomes
a more noisy signal when the capital account is open because it re￿ ects not
only the conditions of the domestic market for loanable funds but also the
changes taking place in international capital markets.
This negative side of an open capital account has to be weighted against
its positive side, namely the fact that production will be higher thanks to the
larger availability of investable funds. We have studied the welfare implications
of an opening of the capital account numerically and have argued that the
net welfare change will tend to be positive when the probability of having
slowdowns is smaller and when the risk aversion of consumers is small.
It is important to stress that the result that an open capital account can
decrease welfare is the product of several market imperfections that the present
model implicitly assumes. These imperfections are mainly related to the ￿nan-
cial market, which suggest that our model should be used to think of problems
that can be encountered in emerging economies where ￿nancial markets are
underdeveloped. The ￿rst of these imperfections is the inexistence of stock
￿nancing, which forces all ￿rms to ￿nance their investment by debt. Stock
￿nancing has the particularity of not demanding any compulsory payment,
in particular in periods where the ￿rm￿ s ￿nances are weak. Thus, if part of
the ￿rms￿investments where ￿nanced by stocks the number of bankrupt ￿rms
would be reduced. A well functioning stock market is arguably more di¢ cult
to put in place than simply allowing domestic ￿rms and banks to borrow from
abroad. As a consequence, capital ￿ ows to developing countries have taken
the form of bank lending and bond issuance much more often than equity
placements; leaving stock markets relatively underdeveloped (see Stiglitz 2000
18for data on this). Our analysis suggest that countries should take the time to
develop an adequate market for equity before liberalizing all capital ￿ ows.
Another implicit assumption that can be identi￿ed to a lack of development
in the ￿nancial sector is the fact that lenders (which could be domestic or
foreign banks) are unable to distinguish between borrowers with di⁄erent levels
of e¢ ciency. In other words, banks are very bad at screening their clients. This
could be the case if the banking sector is inexperienced or if the supervision
that is exerted on it is poor and allows banks to take irresponsible behavior.
Banks will never be able to perfectly recognize their lenders￿abilities, but it
is reasonable to think that they can get better at it and in this way diminish
the number of bankruptcies in the economy. It is then in the interest of the
country to ensure that its banking sector is mature enough and can screen
lenders reasonably well before opening the capital account.
Thus, the present paper is not advocating emerging markets to keep their
economies closed to international ￿nancial ￿ ows. The paper should be regarded
as a quali￿ed warning of some possible dangers that can arise in countries with
an underdeveloped ￿nancial system who chose to open their capital account.
In this we join the general idea expressed in papers like Aghion et al. (2004),
Edwards (2001) or earlier by McKinnon (1991), namely that capital account
openness is not bad per se but that it should be put in place under the right
conditions.
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24Figure 5: Consumptions paths. Closed and Open Capital Account.
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25Figure 7: Welfare as a function of p:
26Figure 8: Percentage change in Welfare after opening the Capital Account.
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A Equilibrium in the closed capital account case
Equations (4), (5) and (6) can be used to calculate the equilibrium of the
model when the capital account is closed.
Market for loanable funds:
wtL = n
T
t + n
Z h￿
t
￿1
hig(hi)dhi (4)
Labor market:
L = n
T
t Lj;t+1 + n
NT
t Li;t+1 (5)
Market for NT goods:
(1 ￿ v)
￿
P NT
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NT
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where:
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T
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B Foreign supply of funds
As discussed in the main text, we consider an upward-sloping foreign supply
of funds. To derive it we can consider that international risk-neutral investors
will drive expected returns at home and abroad to equality. Thus the following
interest rate parity condition will hold:
(1 ￿ p)Rt+1 + p(1 ￿ qt)Rt+1 ￿ ￿(F
￿
t ) = (R
￿ + "t)
Recalling that p is the probability of a bad state of nature and that in
a bad state of nature a proportion qt of all bonds will be defaulted we can
recognize that (1￿p)Rt+1+p(1￿q)Rt+1 is the expected return on investment
in the domestic economy. R￿ + "t is the return that can be obtained in the
28international ￿nancial markets and ￿(F ￿
t ) is the costs to international investors
of investing an amount of F ￿
t in the domestic economy. This cost of investing
abroad has been used, for instance, by Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995) and
Persson and Tabellini (1992). In the same vein as in Persson and Tabellini
(1992), we can interpret them as the extra costs associated with obtaining
information about the country; like its legal and macroeconomic environment.
Using the above interest rate parity condition we derive the foreign supply
of funds as an increasing function of Rt+1 :
F
￿
t = ￿
￿1((1 ￿ pq)Rt+1 ￿ (R
￿ + "t))
Of course, we could also have used a perfectly elastic foreign supply of
funds (this would be the case if ￿(F ￿
t ) = 0): In this case the domestic interest
rate will not react at all to changes in the demand for funds and therefore
would loose all its informational content. To avoid the impression that the
results of the model depend on that particular shape of the foreign supply of
funds we have chosen to treat the more general case when the foreign supply
of funds is not perfectly elastic.
C Equilibrium in the open capital account case
Equations (7) to (11) can be used to calculate the equilibrium of the model
under an open capital account:
Market for loanable funds:
wtL + ￿
￿1((1 ￿ p
l
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T
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Labor market, good state of nature:
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h
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h
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Labor market, bad state of nature:
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l
j;t+1 + n
NT
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Market for NT goods, good state of nature:
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and "l
t and "h
t; de￿ned as the values of the shock to the international ￿nan-
cial markets under each state of nature such that the domestic interest rate
would be the one observed are given by:
if nT
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"
l
t ="t
"
h
t =(1 ￿ p
l
tq)Rt+1 ￿ R
￿ ￿ ￿(n
T;l + n
Z h￿
t
￿1
hig(hi)dhi ￿ wtLt)
if nT
t = nT;l then:
"
l
t =(1 ￿ p
l
tq)Rt+1 ￿ R
￿ ￿ ￿(n
T;h + n
Z h￿
t
￿1
hig(hi)dhi ￿ wtLt)
"
h
t ="t
30D Simulations
In the simulations presented in section 3 of the paper we have used the following
parameter values: ￿ = 1:25;v = 0:5;n = 2;L = 5;p = 0:10;nT;h = 1;nT;l =
0:7;R￿ = 1:15:
For the production functions we have used yi = ci + aiL￿i i = T;NT
and aT = aNT = 1;￿T = ￿NT = 0:5;cT = 5;cNT = 0:
As for the ￿() function we have ￿(F ￿) = k(F ￿)b with k = 1;b = 1:
Finally, hi is distributed among all NT entrepreneurs according to a Normal
distribution with parameter values ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 0:5:
31